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Abstract. Decision making is an active research topic in several disci-
plines and it can be studied in as many ways as different research areas
face the problems in this field of study. In Computer Science, decision-
making problems have been mainly tackled from the research field of Ar-
tificial Intelligence; and Argumentation has contributed with its unique
strengths. In this work, following a pychological perspective we show the
adequacy of Defeasible Logic Programming to model the Dictator Game
by emulating the answers contained in a survey we conducted. The Dicta-
tor Game is a well-known problem belonging to the field of experimental
economic studies related to human decision making. Moreover, the ob-
tained model is simpler than other leading approaches in the area.
Keywords: Human Decision Making, Defeasible Logic Programming,
Experimental Economic Studies, Dictator Game
1 Introduction
The use of argumentative reasoning for decision making is an active research field
in Artificial Intelligence (AI) [1, 4, 5, 7, 9–11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25]. The state of
the art is vast, and the different works related to argumentation-based decision
making can be organized according to different dimensions, namely: the decision
problem tackled (decision under uncertainty [1, 20], multi-criteria decision [1, 5,
11, 25], single-agent [10, 11, 13, 14], multi-agent [4, 20], etc.), how eligible alter-
natives are conceived (marketing approach [10, 11, 13, 14], goal-based [1, 17, 20],
etc.) the underlying argumentation framework (abstract [1, 7, 9], dynamic [14],
concrete [5, 10, 11, 13, 25], etc.) whether decision behavior is formalized with re-
spect to a classical decision approach [1, 10, 11, 14] or not [4, 5, 9, 25], whether
the decision process needs a particular agent architecture to be embeeded in [19,
24] or not [10, 11, 13, 14], among others.
As stated in [21], it is well-known that in AI all the developed systems that
concern thinking and acting, can be broadly classified depending on whether
they follow a human-centered approach or a rationalist approach. The former
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approach measures the systems success in terms of the fidelity to human perfor-
mance, while the latter involves measuring the systems performance against the
ideal one, so-called rationality.
Several disciplines have contributed ideas and techniques to AI, and in par-
ticular, regarding decision making, we can highlight Philosophy, Sociology, Psy-
chology and Economics. As expected, in psychological research of individuals
decision making there exist several research programs based on Simon’s criticism
of mainstream economic models of perfect rationality (e.g., see [23]). Moreover,
as stated in [6], the decision making research program in psychology was domi-
nated by Tversky and Kahneman’s approach (e.g., see [26]) empirically testing
Simon’s suggestions and showing that they were correct.
In this context, [4] is an interesting paper arising from the Computer Science
field, where different studies from experimental economic are modeled using
an argumentative framework to reproduce the qualitative decisions that hu-
mans exhibited in the studies conducted. In particular two well-known games
were studied, the Dictator game [15] and the Ultimatum game [18] and results
were compared with those reported by humans with different cultural back-
ground. Argument schemes were used as the underlying argumentation approach
and they were instantiated with Action-based Alternating Transition Systems
(AATS) [27]. Instantiating the argument scheme used in [2] and its associated
critical questions, allows to obtain the set of conflicting arguments. Once this
set has been produced, in order to evaluate the arguments acceptability, they
are organized in a Value-based Argumentation Framework (VAF) [3].
A VAF is an extension of the standard Argumentation Framework (AF) [8].
VAFs extend AFs in that each argument in the graph is associated with the
value promoted by that argument. Whereas in an AF attacks always succeed,
in a VAF they succeed only if the value associated with the attacker is ranked
by the audience evaluating the VAF equal to, or higher than, the argument it
attacks. Unsuccessful attacks are removed, and then the resulting framework is
evaluated as a standard AF. The VAF thus accounts for elements of subjectivity
in that the arguments that are acceptable are dependant upon the audience’s
ranking of the values involved in the scenario.
Another interesting proposal, where non-rational decision making is discussed
even though it is not the primary focus of the paper, is the work presented
in [14]—where the proposed argumentation-based model of decision-making gen-
eralizes the classical maximum-expected utility model using a Dynamic Argu-
mentation Framework. Apart from this, the working methodology presented
in [14] also paves the way for non-rational behavior to be taken into account
in decision making by using argumentation. In fact, the methodology of [14] is
similar to that of [12] in the way alternatives are compared in a pairwise manner,
but where the use of decision rules is needed when decisions to be made must
be rational.
Therefore, by considering the approach of [12], in the paper at hand we model
human decision making by using Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) [16], a
formalism that combines results of Logic Programming and Defeasible Argu-
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mentation. It is worth mentioning, that in [12], the focus of the work is the
combination of autonomous navigation with high-level reasoning and decision
making is based on a greedy policy, by using DeLP as well. Besides this real
world domain, DeLP has been used to solve other real world problems (cf. [22]).
Moreover, DeLP has been succesfully used to model rational decision making [10]
and showing its flexibility to model human decision making as well, makes richer
its application field. In particular, in this work we will tackle the Dictator game
by modeling the answers contained in a survey conducted by us.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces DeLP,
the argumentation formalism used to model the Dictador game. Then, Sect. 3,
presents the formulation of this game based on DeLP. Finally, Sect. 4 disscuss
the model proposed considering other related works and draws the conclusions.
2 Defeasible Logic Programming in a Nutshell
As mentioned in the introductory section, DeLP [16] is the argumentation for-
malism that it will be used for knowledge representation, reasoning and finally
model human decision making. Besides, the literal-based criterion used to de-
cide between conflicting arguments is also presented, since it is not the default
criterion provided by the formalism.
A DeLP-program P is denoted (Π,∆), where the set Π containing indis-
putable knowleged (facts and strict rules) is distinguished from ∆ containing
defeasible rules. Facts are ground literals representing atomic information or
the negation of atomic information, by using strong negation (“∼”). Strict rules
are denoted L0← L1, . . . , Ln and represent firm information, whereas defeasible
rules are denoted L0 —< L1, . . . , Ln and represent tentative information. In both
cases, the head L0 is a literal and the body {Li}i>0 is a set of literals. Strict
and defeasible rules are ground, however, following the usual convention, some
examples will use “schematic rules” with variables. It is worth noticing that
strong negation is allowed in the head of program rules, and hence may be used
to represent contradictory knowledge.
In DeLP, to deal with contradictory and dynamic information, arguments for
conflicting pieces of information are built and then compared to decide which
one prevails. An argument for a literal L, denoted hA, Li, is a minimal set of
defeasible rules A⊆∆, such that A ∪ Π is non-contradictory and there is a
derivation for L from A ∪ Π. To establish if hA, Li is a non-defeated argument,
argument rebuttals or counter-arguments that could be defeaters for hA, Li are
considered, i.e. counter-arguments that by some criterion are preferred to hA, Li.
Since counter-arguments are arguments, defeaters for them may exist, and de-
featers for these defeaters, and so on. Thus, a sequence of arguments called
argumentation line is constructed, where each argument defeats its predecessor
in the line (for a detailed explanation of this dialectical process see [16]). The
prevailing argument provides a warrant for the information it supports. A literal
L is warranted from (Π,∆) if a non-defeated argument A supporting L exists.
Given a query Q there are four possible answers: yes, if Q is warranted; no, if
13ISBN 978-987-4417-90-9
CACIC 2020
DIIT UNLaM / Red UNCI
the complement of Q is warranted; undecided, if neither Q nor its complement
are warranted; and unknown, if Q is not in the language of the program.
In DeLP, generalized specificity is used as default criterion to compare con-
flicting arguments, but an advantageous feature of DeLP is that the comparison
criterion among arguments can be replaced in a modular way. Therefore, in
our proposal, we use an appropriate literal-based criterion—that was originally
proposed in [10]. In a program P, a subset of literals comp-lits(P) ⊆ Π called
comparison literals will be distinguished. This set of comparison literals will be
used by the comparison criterion defined below.
Definition 1 (L-order). Let P be a DeLP-program and comp-lits(P) be the
set of comparison literals in P. An L-order over P is a partial order over the
elements of comp-lits(P).
An L-order must be provided as a set of facts within the program. These
facts are written as L1 > L2, stating that a literal L1 is preferred to a literal L2,
and they will be used to decide when an argument is better than another. Based
on a given L-order, the following argument comparison criterion can be defined.
Definition 2 (Literal-based comparison criterion). Let P = (Π,∆) be a
DeLP-program and let “>” be an L-order over P. Given two argument structures
hA1, h1i and hA2, h2i, the argument hA1, h1i will be preferred over hA2, h2i iff:
1. there are two literals L1 and L2 such that L1 ∈∗ A1, L2 ∈∗ A2, L1 > L2,
and
2. there are no literals L01 and L
0
2 such that L
0
1 ∈∗ A1, L02 ∈∗ A2, and L02 > L01.
Notation: L ∈∗ A iff there exists a defeasible rule (L0 —< L1, L2, . . . , Ln) in A
and L = Li for some i (0 ≤ i ≤ n).
3 Modeling the Dictator Game
In this section we show how DeLP can be used to model the Dictator Game [15].
We begin by considering the problem formulation. Following the problem state-
ment from [4], we will consider the same limited number of options that com-
prise the set of alternatives (actions) A and we assume 1000 units of money to
be divided. The set A thus comprises the following five actions corresponding
to different divisions of the money, namely: a1 = give(70%), a2 = give(100%),
a3 = give(50%), a4 = give(0%) and a5 = give(30%). The dictator starts having
the whole money and the “motivations” to share it that we have considered are
mentioned below:
Money: Most obvious is money’s value. This is what the economic man is
supposed to maximize. Given that we need to recognize that the other player
having money may be considered positively by the dictator, we need to
distinguish money for the dictator himself from money for the other.
Giving: It can be held that giving a gift is a source of pleasure, and this is what
motivates the dictator to share.
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Image: Another consideration is the desire not to appear mean before the ex-
perimenter that motivates sharing. It could even be that one does not want
to appear mean to oneself.
Equality: Equality, as defined by an equal distribution, characterizes a sense
of fairness.
In our model, these motivations are used as the criteria to compare the alter-
natives among each other. Some of these motivations establish well-defined pref-
erence orderings among the alternatives; for example, the money the dictator has
for himself that will be represented by the comparison literalms, clearly produces
the following ordering among the alternatives: a4 ≺ a5 ≺ a3 ≺ a1 ≺ a2—where
ai ≺ aj denotes that action ai is preferred to aj . Conversely, “the money for
the other” motivation (mo) generates a mirror-like ordering of the alternatives:
a2 ≺ a1 ≺ a3 ≺ a5 ≺ a4.
The remaining motivations can be considered more subjectives and different
orderings can be obtained depending on the individuals’ personality and cultural
background. In this context, one possible ordering of all the alternatives accord-
ing to these motivations is the one presented in Table 1, as facts that belong to
set Π of the DeLP-program that will be used to model the game. It is worth
noticing that this table contains more information than the ordering itself. The
particular ordering we refer is represented as black-colored comparison literals
(factual information) while the references to arguments names in other colors
will be discussed later. We can see for example, in the first two columns of the
table –in a pairwise comparison manner– the two above-mentioned orderings
regarding ms and mo motivations.
Having as a guideline the working methodology of previous works [10, 12,
14] which have used a literal-based comparison criterion for arguments, we have
built the set ∆ of our DeLP-program as shown below in Fig. 1(a). Besides,
the L-order of the comparison literals is presented in Fig. 1(b). This L-order
states that the preferences on the motivations used as criteria are the following:
giv ≺ mo ≺ ms ≺ im ≺ eq—and it was obtained from the survey we conducted
to carried out this reasearch.
Our survey is composed by 276 samples, i.e. 276 different people that played
the Dictador game. They are mainly students of the National University of San
Luis but also 2.9% of the people are employed in the private industry and 3.3%
work in the public sector. Considering their origin, 84% were born in the capital
of San Luis and the remaining 16% were born in 19 different cities from San Luis
province and other provinces from Argentina. All the people live in San Luis at
present. Ages ranged from 17 to 54 years old, with an approximate mean of 22
years old. Regarding educational level, 96% of the participants have completed
secondary education and only 4% have completed a tertiary level. When gender
is considered, 73% of the samples correspond to female individuals and 27% to
male individuals. Finally, it is worth mentioning that 93% of the people do not
have children, while the remaining 7% do.
The answers obtained from the survey reported that 66.67% of people chose
a3 = give(50%), 10.87% chose a2 = give(100%), 9.78% chose a4 = give(0%),
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9.42% chose a5 = give(30%) and 3.26% chose a1 = give(70%). It is beyond the
scope of our present study to analyze the possible reasons of these behaviors,
but as mentioned above, this ordering of the alternatives resulted in the L-
order presented in Fig. 1(b). This is due to the fact that having this L-order,
our DeLP-program has the same choice behavior than the one observed in our
survey. As expected, different answer would produce different L-orders so that
the DeLP-program can perform a choice behavior conformant to the survey.
As mentioned above, Table 1 contains factual information where actions are
compared in a pairwise manner considering the motivations to share the money
that the dictador has. These facts were stated considering the rules of the game
and our understanding of some elements of subjectivity—like for instance, if
giving more than half of the money is a source of pleasure for the dictator. In
our view it is not, and that is why facts like giv(a2, a1), giv(a2, a3), giv(a2, a4),
giv(a2, a5), giv(a1, a3), giv(a1, a4), giv(a1, a5) and giv(a5, a4), were not included
in Π. In this way, taking into account the factual information present in Π about
the comparison literal giv where alternative a3 is deemed better than the other
ones when compared among each other, provided us a firm reason to set this
comparison literal in the first place of the L-order.
Then mo was placed second in the L-order given its direct relation with the
fact that a2 was the second action chosen in the survey. Following a similar pat-
tern of reasoning ms was placed third given its relation with a4. First and second
columns of Table 1 show the facts encoding the alternatives orderings according
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(1) better(X,Y ) —< ms(X,Y )
(2) ∼better(Y,X) —< ms(X,Y ) giv(Z,W ) > ms(W,Z)
(3) better(X,Y ) —< mo(X,Y ) giv(Z,W ) > mo(W,Z)
(4) ∼better(Y,X) —< mo(X,Y ) giv(Z,W ) > im(W,Z)
(5) better(X,Y ) —< giv(X,Y ) giv(Z,W ) > eq(W,Z)
(6) ∼better(Y,X) —< giv(X,Y ) mo(Z,W ) > ms(W,Z)
(7) better(X,Y ) —< im(X,Y ) mo(Z,W ) > im(W,Z)
(8) ∼better(Y,X) —< im(X,Y ) mo(Z,W ) > eq(W,Z)
(9) better(X,Y ) —< eq(X,Y ) ms(Z,W ) > im(W,Z)
(10) ∼better(Y,X) —< eq(X,Y ) ms(Z,W ) > eq(W,Z)
im(Z,W ) > eq(W,Z)
(11) choose(X) —< better(X,Y )
(12) ∼choose(X) —< better(Y,X)
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) Set ∆ containing the rules to compare the alternatives among each other
and choosing the final alternative. (b) L-order over the comparison literals.
to these criteria, where as aforesaid, they are objective. Finally, comparison lit-
erals im and eq which are also subjectives were placed fourth and fifth in the
L-order, respectively—im was placed before than eq, given that all the actions
can be compared against each other with this criterion and with eq cannot.
In this way, with an L-order defined, based on the factual information pre-
sented in Table 1 and through the application of the defeasible rules in Fig. 1(a)
aiming at comparing the alternatives, 94 arguments can be built supporting
whether an action ai is better or not than another action aj. For example, in
Fig. 2(b), ten arguments are shown and they were built using rule (5) from
Fig. 1(a) together with the facts of third column of Table 1. The names of these
arguments also appear in the top-right corner of each cell of this column indicat-
ing that they can be built from the factual information included in the cell. The
same notation is used for all the cells at the table, and due to space constraints
it is not possible to show all these arguments in the paper at hand.
It is worth noting that the colors each argument name has (on the top-right
corner of the cell), are related to the attack graph depicted in Fig. 2(a). This so-
called attack graph is not the usual attack graph from abstract argumentation
frameworks; it rather is a graphical representation that we found convenient
to summarize how the different arguments generated support which alternative
is better than another one depending on the criterion considered. As it can
be observed, the nodes correspond to the alternatives and they are differently
colored as well as their outcoming arcs. The labels on the arcs represent the
number of the argument by which an alternive is supported better than another
one. For instance, number 55 labels the arc from a4 to a1, and its corresponding
argument A55 can be observed in Fig. 2(b). But also, argument A1 –colored in
violet in Table 1– supports that action a4 is better than a1 by means of rule (1)
(cf. Fig. 1(a)). Besides, all the arguments names colored in gray which appear on
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A41 = {better(a3, a4) —< giv(a3, a4)}
A43 = {better(a3, a5) —< giv(a3, a5)}
A45 = {better(a3, a2) —< giv(a3, a2)}
A47 = {better(a3, a1) —< giv(a3, a1)}
A49 = {better(a5, a4) —< giv(a5, a4)}
A51 = {better(a5, a2) —< giv(a5, a2)}
A53 = {better(a5, a1) —< giv(a5, a1)}
A55 = {better(a4, a1) —< giv(a4, a1)}
A57 = {better(a4, a2) —< giv(a4, a2)}
A59 = {better(a1, a2) —< giv(a1, a2)}
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. (a) Attack graph relating the alternatives and the different arguments support-
ing their comparison. (b) Subset of arguments supporting the comparison of different
alternatives based on the comparison literal giv.
the bottom-right corner of each cell of Table 1, correspond to the complementary
arguments that can be obtained with the fact in the cell together with one of the
defeasible rules having the literal ∼better(Y,X) in their heads—and that were
not included in the graphical representation of Fig. 2(a).
So far, all the arguments considered aim at comparing the actions among each
other, and the following literals are warranted: bt(a1, a2), ∼bt(a2, a1), bt(a3, a1),
∼bt(a1, a3), bt(a3, a2), ∼bt(a2, a3), bt(a3, a4), ∼bt(a4, a3), bt(a3, a5), ∼bt(a5, a3),
bt(a4, a1), ∼bt(a1, a4), bt(a4, a2), ∼bt(a2, a4), bt(a5, a1), ∼bt(a1, a5), bt(a5, a2),
∼bt(a2, a5), bt(a5, a4) and ∼bt(a4, a5). We have abbreviated literal better as bt
to improve the sentence reading. These literals can be used together with rules
(11) and (12) (cf. Fig. 1(a)) to build arguments supporting which action must
be chosen.
Given that action a3 is deemed better than the other alternatives based on
the most preferred comparison literal (giv), by using rule (12), three arguments
supporting ∼choose(a1), ∼choose(a4) and ∼choose(a5) can be built. These ar-
guments will act as blocking defeaters for the arguments that can be built sup-
porting choose(a1), choose(a4) and choose(a5), respectively. Because all of them
are based on comparison literal giv, considering the comparison criterion used
(cf. Definition 2) the answer of the DeLP interpreter is undecided. Conversely,
the arguments built –by means of rule (11)– that support conclusion choose(a3)
cannot be defeated and hence choose(a3) is warranted, and the answer of the
DeLP interpreter is yes—coinciding with the most chosen action in the survey.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have given an account of argumentation-based decision making
in a simple scenario from experimental economics, like the Dictator game. In
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particular, DeLP was used to model human choice behavior from a survey we
conducted. The obtained program was simple and there was no need to use the
decision device called decision rules; a device widely used in previous works [10,
11, 14] where rational decision making was pursued rather than human decision
making. Besides, regarding the DeLP-program used in [12], the current proposal
is also more concise since only two rules of the form choose(X) —< better(X,Y )
and ∼choose(X) —< better(Y,X), were needed to decide the final action to be
chosen. Naturally, if the answers in the survey had been different, we could have
had to resort to add more rules for choosing alternatives or even using decision
rules despite not being modeling a rational decision behavior.
Regarding the leading work presented in [4], our proposal is simpler since
all the modeling is performend within DeLP instead of performing a two-stage
process to instantiate an argument scheme with an AATS to obtain the set of
conflicting arguments and then building a VAF in order to evaluate the argu-
ments acceptability. With this work, we aimed at showing the flexibility that
DeLP has to model different decision making scenarios and not necessarily those
strictly related to rational decisions thus making richer its application field.
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10. Ferretti, E., Errecalde, M., Garćıa, A., Simari, G.: Decision rules and arguments
in defeasible decision making. In: 2nd International Conference on Computational
Models of Arguments (COMMA). pp. 171–182. IOS Press (2008)
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